SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey Supreme Court cases of interest to practitioners. In so
doing, we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some
of the more interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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EVIDENCE-EXPERT

TESTIMONY-EXPERT WITNESS'S THEORY OF

CAUSATION IN ToxIc TORT LITIGATION ADMISSIBLE IF BASED
ON SOUND METHODOLOGY INVOLVING TYPE OF FACTS RELIED

FIELD-Rubanick v. Witco Chemical
Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 593 A.2d 733 (1991).
ON BY SCIENTISTS IN THAT

During their employment at defendant Witco Chemical Corporation (Witco), Ronald G. Rubanick and Anthony DeMaio
were exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 125 N.J. at
424, 593 A.2d at 734. Rubanick, who had worked at Witco since
1974, was diagnosed as having colon cancer in 1979. Id. at 425,
593 A.2d at 735. Rubanick died the following year at twenty-nine
years of age. DeMaio, a fifty-two year old man who had worked
at Witco for thirty years, died of colon cancer in 1984. The families of Rubanick and DeMaio each brought a wrongful death action against Witco, alleging that the deaths were caused by
exposure to PCBs during employment at Witco.
At the pretrial stage of the Rubanick action, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Law Division, conducted a hearing to establish
whether the plaintiffs sole expert witness, Dr. Balis, was qualified
to testify on the cause of the decedent's colon cancer. Id. at 42526, 593 A.2d at 735. Dr. Balis was a cancer researcher who possessed a doctorate in biochemistry. Id. at 426, 593 A.2d at 735.
Although Dr. Balis never examined Rubanick, Dr. Balis believed
that Rubanick's cancer was caused by PCBs. Id. Dr. Balis testified that this conclusion was warranted by scientific studies that
established a link between PCBs and cancer in laboratory animals, as well as several articles which posited that PCBs were carcinogenic. Id. at 426-27, 593 A.2d at 735-36. Dr. Balis also
pointed to Rubanick's young age and his cancer-free family history, as well as the fact that out of a total of only 105 Witco employees, three other workers besides Rubanick and DeMaio had
also developed some form of cancer. Id.
The trial court additionally heard testimony from the defendant's three expert witnesses, two of whom were licensed
medical doctors. Id. at 427-30, 593 A.2d at 736-37. According to
these experts, it was not appropriate to connect the findings
made in regard to cancer in laboratory animals to theories about
PCBs as a carcinogen in humans. Id. The defendant's experts
also testified that studies done on the effect of PCBs in humans
were inconsistent and not conclusive as to whether exposure to
PCBs caused cancer. Id.
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Finding that Dr. Balis's theory about the cause of Rubanick's
cancer did not enjoy general acceptance within the scientific community, the trial court ruled his testimony inadmissible. Id. at
430, 593 A.2d at 737 (citing Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 225
NJ. Super. 485, 492-503, 542 A.2d 975, 983 (1988)). The court
subsequently granted summary judgment against both Rubanick
and DeMaio, who had also planned to use Dr. Balis as the sole
expert witness for his claim. Id. at 430, 593 A.2d at 737-38. The
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed, finding
the traditional standard of admissibility employed by the trial
court to be too stringent given the unique nature of toxic-tort
litigation. Id. at 430-31, 593 A.2d at 738. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate division and remanded the
case to the trial court for an assessment of Dr. Balis's expert
opinion under a broader standard. Id. at 454, 593 A.2d at 750.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, first examined the conventional standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony. Id. at 431, 593 A.2d at 738 (quoting N.J. EVID. R.
56(2)). Thejustice noted that a party seeking to introduce expert
testimony is required to show that the expert's theory enjoyed
"general acceptance" within the professional or scientific community. Id. at 432, 593 A.2d at 738 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J.
178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984)). According to the court, the general
acceptance test was not traditionally met unless the expert's theory was at least recognized by a "substantial minority" of the scientific community. Id. (citing Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 225
N.J. Super. 485, 498-500, 542 A.2d 975, 983 (1988)). Justifying
this standard, Justice Handler explained that jurors might mistakenly assign great weight to expert testimony that is, in fact, unreliable solely because the evidence has been characterized as
"expert." Id. at 433, 593 A.2d at 739 (quoting Ryan v. KDI Sylvan
Pools, 121 N.J. 276, 285, 579 A.2d 1241, 1246 (1990)).
Nevertheless, the supreme court announced a more flexible
standard for determining the admissibility of expert opinions regarding causation in toxic-tort litigation. Id. The court recognized that plaintiffs bringing toxic-tort claims face an extremely
difficult burden in trying to prove causation. Id., 593 A.2d at 739
(quoting Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 584, 525 A.2d
287, 301 (1987)). Justice Handler noted that long periods of latency between exposure to a chemical and the manifestation of
toxically-induced illness render it difficult to prove, years later,
that a specific exposure to a chemical was the source of the dis-
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ease rather than some other intervening cause. Id. (quotingAyers
v.Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 582, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (1987)).
The court also recognized that because of the scientific uncertainty surrounding carcinogenesis, the "general acceptance" test
would result in the dismissal of many toxic-tort claims despite
compelling evidence. Id. at 433-34, 593 A.2d at 739. Accordingly, the court reasoned that justice would be better served if
judges were allowed to make intuitive assumptions about toxictort causation that had not yet been scientifically proven, rather
than allowing disputes in this important area to go unresolved.
Id. at 436-37, 593 A.2d at 741 (citations omitted).
In determining what analysis to employ, the court looked to
the approaches of other jurisdictions that relaxed the standard
for admitting expert testimony regarding toxic-tort causation. Id.
at 438, 593 A.2d at 741. Justice Handler noted that some courts
allowed the trier of fact to determine the credibility of an expert's
theory as long as the opinion was grounded in a sound methodology, even if the theory's conclusions were not generally accepted. Id. at 438-39, 593 A.2d at 741-42. Justice Handler
found particularly insightful the analysis employed by the Third
Circuit, which took into account whether the facts forming the
opinion of the expert were the kind of information that experts in
that scientific field reasonably relied upon. Id. at 445-46, 593
A.2d at 745-46 (quoting In rejapanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238,
276 (3d Cir. 1983); FED. R. EVID. 703).
Finding the Third Circuit's approach consistent with New
Jersey's Rules of Evidence, the supreme court held that an expert's opinion of causation in a toxic-tort claim was admissible,
regardless of whether its conclusions enjoyed general acceptance, if based on a well-founded methodology involving the kind
of facts and data reasonably relied upon in that field of science.
Id. at 447, 449, 593 A.2d at 746, 747-48. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the trial court to assess Dr. Balis's testimony in light of the new standard, while noting that, based on
the record, it appeared that Dr. Balis's theory of causation was
sufficiently reliable. Id. at 450, 454, 593 A.2d at 748, 750.
Justice Handler concluded the opinion by refuting the argument that a relaxed standard would open the door to highly paid
plaintiffis experts who could proffer any theory of causation, no
matter how discredited, merely by finding the least amount of
agreement in the vast array of scientific literature. Id. at 453, 593
A.2d at 749 (citation omitted). According to the justice, the de-
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fendant as well as the plaintiff could engage in this type of
"hired-gun" approach by utilizing the scientific uncertainty in the
area of toxicology to find weaknesses in even the most well-supported causation theories. Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, this
problem, in the court's view, was best solved through a careful
weighing of each expert's credibility by the trier of fact. Id., 593
A.2d at 750.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, by broadening the standard
of admissibility for expert opinions on causation, has eroded a
major barrier to toxic tort claims. The court seemed determined
to sever the link between scientific and legal causation. This is
especially apparent in Justice Handler's suggestion that unproven causation theories be assessed in light of "intuition" and
"assumptions" that certain chemicals are harmful. This analysis
is flawed because, obviously, an individual judge's personal feeling, or even a societal consensus, that a certain substance causes
cancer does not make it objectively true absent scientific validation. Ordinarily there should be no place for such lay assumptions in the adjudication of those disputes implicating scientific
knowledge.
Nevertheless, the Rubanick decision is welcome in a world
that is becoming increasingly polluted with toxic chemicals and
other environmental hazards. The stakes are simply too high for
the judicial system to await consensus in the scientific community
before allowing a jury to conclude that a substance is toxic and
carcinogenic. The court correctly recognized the unique nature
of both toxic substances and carcinogenesis, with the former's
ability to extinguish life quickly outpacing scientific comprehension of the latter. The supreme court has chosen to err on the
side of condemning potentially harmless chemicals rather than
risk leaving some cancer-causing substances unchecked. For the
sake of every person who unknowingly comes into contact with
toxic substances during the routines of their daily lives, this is
truly the only rational choice.
Randall]. Peach

1086

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

CIVIL PROCEDURE-EXPERT

[Vol. 22:1082

TESTIMONY-OPINION TESTIMONY

OF EXPERT ORIGINALLY CONSULTED BY ADVERSARY ADMITrED

WITHOUT

EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES

AS

NON-PREJUDI-

CIAL-Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 599 A.2d 149
(1991).
The defendant, Dr. Isaac Gielchinsky, performed heart surgery on the plaintiff, Bernard Graham, on April 14, 1982. 126
N.J. at 363, 599 A.2d at 150-5 1. Subsequent to the procedure, it
was necessary to remove a pacemaker and five pacemaker wires
from Graham's chest. Id., 599 A.2d at 151. Dr. Gielchinsky performed the second operation, but left three wires in Graham's
chest. On May 14, 1982, the doctor performed a third procedure
to remedy an infection in Graham's chest wall. The infection
worsened, however, and Dr. Gielchinsky performed a fourth surgical procedure without removing the remaining wires. Id. at
363-64, 599 A.2d at 151. Graham entered a different hospital in
September, 1983, for an unrelated problem. Because the chest
area was still infected, Graham consulted a surgeon who subsequently removed the remaining wires. Soon after, the infection
cleared.
Graham filed a complaint alleging negligence by Dr.
Gielchinsky. Graham's first attorney sent him to Dr. Frederick
Primich for an examination, but Dr. Primich did not find any negligence on the part of Dr. Gielchinsky. Graham then obtained a
new attorney who sent him to Dr. Joseph Silva. Dr. Silva concluded that Dr. Gielchinsky negligently failed to remove the
wires. The defense somehow obtained a copy of Dr. Primich's
report and asked him to testify on Dr. Gielchinsky's behalf. The
trial court admitted Dr. Primich's testimony.
A jury verdict favored Dr. Gielchinsky. Id. On appeal, Graham raised three issues. Id. First, he argued that the judge erred
in allowing the doctor's expert testimony. Id. Second, Graham
asserted that Dr. Primich violated a court ruling that prohibited
him from revealing the identity of the party who first consulted
him. Id. at 364-65, 599 A.2d at 151. Lastly, he argued that defense counsel made improper remarks during summation. Id. at
365, 599 A.2d at 151. Despite these contentions, the appellate
division affirmed the jury verdict. Id. Graham appealed to the
New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
Justice O'Hern, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the
decisions of the lower courts and held that Dr. Primich's testi-
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mony did not unfairly prejudice the jury. Id. at 376, 599 A.2d at
157. Justice O'Hern traced the roots of expert opinion discovery
and recognized initial resistance to such disclosures under the
"work product rule." Id. at 365, 599 A.2d at 152. This rule, the
justice explained, protected the efforts of attorneys who built
their clients' cases through discovery. Id. The majority further
observed that the attorney-client privilege prevented discovery
and use of information obtained by the expert because the expert
would likely reveal privileged information. Id. at 366, 599 A.2d at
152.
The court noted, however, that judges have increasingly permitted discovery of expert witness reports and that traditionally
strict notions of discovery have yielded to more liberal, pragmatic
approaches. Id. As evidence of this modern approach, Justice
O'Hern submitted that both the 1969 New Jersey Rules of Civil
Procedure (N.J. Rules) and the 1970 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) provided for discovery of expert witness'
opinions. Id. Thejustice also noted that the amended NewJersey
Rules permitted discovery of expert reports if the expert was expected to testify at trial. Id. at 366-67, 599 A.2d at 152 (citing N.J.
R. CIv. P. 4:10-2). Justice O'Hern acknowledged that the legislature intended this liberal discovery approach to promote effective cross-examination. Id. at 367, 599 A.2d at 152. In addition,
the court recognized that Rule 4:10-2(d)(3) allowed discovery of
a non-testifying expert's opinion if that expert was retained in
anticipation of litigation and "exceptional circumstances" existed. Id., 599 A.2d at 152-53.
The justice then explored policies concerning the use of an
adversary's expert testimony. Id., 599 A.2d at 153. The majority
contrasted courts that did not compel testimony of an expert
when that expert had consulted to appear for the adversary with
courts that favored testimonial compulsion of all experts. Id. at
367-68, 599 A.2d at 153. In the latter case, Justice O'Hern recognized the peculiarity of a court ruling that compelled trial testimony from a non-testifying expert even though that expert could
not be deposed. Id. at 368, 599 A.2d at 153.
Adding that a minority of states, including New Jersey, did
not allow compulsion of expert testimony, the justice pointed out
that New Jersey courts have rarely entertained the issue. Id. at
369, 599 A.2d at 153-54. Moreover. Justice O'Hern found no
uniformity in the few existing decisions. Id., 599 A.2d at 154. For
example, the court noted two decisions that concluded the physi-
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cian-patient privilege precluded physicians from testifying
against patients as liability experts. Id. at 369-70, 599 A.2d at
154 (citing Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. Super. 392, 476 A.2d 1279
(Law Div. 1984); Serrano v. Levitsky, 215 N.J. Super. 454, 521 A.2d
1377 (Law Div. 1986)). Justice O'Hern then contrasted several
cases that permitted defendants to call plaintiffs' physicians as
witnesses because trials are "a search for the truth." Id. at 36970, 599 A.2d at 154 (quoting Kurdek v. West Orange Bd. of Educ.,
222 N.J. Super. 218, 536 A.2d 332 (Law Div. 1987)). The court,
however, posited that the "search-for-truth" theory required discovery of all experts' reports without a finding of exceptional circumstances under Rule 4:10-2(d)(3). Id. at 371, 599 A.2d at 155
(citing Genovese v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J. Super.

375, 560 A.2d 1272 (App. Div.), certif denied, 118 N.J. 196, 570
A.2d 960 (1989)).
The court next addressed the conflict between: admitting all
relevant expert testimony that will affect the disposition of a case
and the unfairness that may result from admitting such evidence.
Id. at 371-72, 599 A.2d at 155. Justice O'Hern suggested that
admitting expert opinions, while imposing restrictions on expert
testimony, could bar effective cross-examination. Id. The justice
recognized that the drafters used this as part of the rationale for
amending the rule. Id. The majority advanced that Dr. Primich
was not a compelled witness and may have had an ulterior motive
for testifying. Id. Hence, Justice O'Hern considered that crossexamination of Dr. Primich may have been necessary in the
search for the truth. Id. The justice recognized that lawyers who
place unfavorable expert evidence into their clients' case-in-chief
would be open to numerous malpractice claims. Id. at 372-73,
599 A.2d at 155. Therefore, the court stressed that no unfair
advantage should be taken when a lawyer attempts to evaluate a
specific case. Id. at 373, 599 A.2d at 155.
Having reached that conclusion, the justice re-emphasized
the merits of the adversarial system and the integral part which
the work-product privilege holds in the promotion of trial fairness. Id. Following the New Jersey Rules, the court maintained
that truth was more likely to emerge when the use of an adversary's expert opinion was only permitted in exceptional circumstances. Id., 599 A.2d at 156. Justice O'Hern rejected the
argument that the New Jersey Rules encouraged parties to corner
the market of available, qualified experts. Id. (citations omitted).
The justice further contended that the "exceptional circum-
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stances" requirement alleviated any possible unfairness. Id. (citations omitted).
Justice O'Hern next considered the problems concerning
the enforceability of a general exclusionary rule. Id. at 374, 599
A.2d at 156. For example, the justice expressed that such evidence may be helpful to prevent misuse of public funds when a
public interest is involved. Id. The court therefore maintained
that all rule changes should be made by the Civil Practice Committee, which is better equipped to balance all concerns regarding a fair trial. Id.
Returning to the case at bar, Justice O'Hern investigated
whether the defense counsel's trial tactics actually prejudiced the
trial on the issues. Id. The justice stated that the plaintiff believed several of the defense counsel's direct examination questions conflicted with the court's direction. Id. The court also
noted the plaintiffs argument that the defense counsel improperly suggested that the plaintiff originally retained Dr. Primich in
1985. Id. at 375, 599 A.2d at 156. The court dismissed this contention and concluded that the defense counsel's reference in his
summation referred only to the doctor's records. Id., 599 A.2d at
157. Justice O'Hern similarly dismissed any arguments concerning defense counsel's allegedly objectionable comments. Id.
The justice concluded that the defendant offered evidence
other than Dr. Primich's testimony and that the jury was able to
agree with the opinion of another defense expert who concluded
that removal of the wires was more dangerous than leaving them
intact. Id. Thus, the court held that the defense counsel's trial
tactics and Dr. Primich's testimony did not unfairly prejudice the
jury. Id. at 375-76, 599 A.2d at 157.
The New Jersey Rules state that discovery of an adversary's
expert should only be granted in "exceptional circumstances."
Justice O'Hern did not probe the definition of exceptional circumstances nor did he state whether the case at bar contained
any conditions that warranted the expert opinion testimony.
Certainly, it may be easy to endorse the opinions of the lower
courts and agree that Dr. Primich's testimony did not prejudice
the jury. The court should not address the prejudice question,
however, until it has first decided whether exceptional circumstances exist. IfJustice O'Hern concluded that Dr. Primich's testimony did not sway the jury because other similar evidence was
offered, then no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant its
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admittance. The New Jersey Supreme Court clearly misapplied
New Jersey Civil Procedure Rule 4:10-2(d)(3).
Michael T. Sweeney

ATTORNEY ETHICS-ADVERTISING--FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOES NOT PROTECT ATrORNEY SOLICITATION THAT INVADES THE PRIVACY OF VICTIMS OR

THEIR RELATIVES-In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, 599 A.2d 1265

(1992).
Alexander Lowenstein, a resident of Morristown, New Jersey
was killed on December 21, 1988, in the explosion of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 126 NJ. at 452, 599
A.2d at 1267 (1992). On January 4, 1989, the day after Alexander's remains were identified, respondent Magdy Anis, mailed a
solicitation letter to the decedent's father, Peter Lowenstein.
The letter, sent on behalf of Magdy and his brother/law partner
Fady Anis, expressed the brothers' interest in representing Lowenstein and specified that Messrs. Anis were experienced personal injury attorneys who would "substantially reduce the
customary one-third fee that most attorneys would charge." Id. at
452-53, 454, 599 A.2d at 1267, 1268.
On January 12, 1989, Peter Lowenstein filed a complaint
with the Office of Attorney Ethics which thereafter referred the
issue to the Committee on Attorney Advertising (Advertising
Committee). The complaint alleged that the Anis' violated Rule
of Professional Conduct (RPC) 7.3 (b)(1) by soliciting business
when they knew or should have known that the prospective client's physical, mental or emotional condition prevented the exercise of reasonable judgment in retaining a lawyer. Id., 599 A.2d
at 1268. An amendment to the complaint additionally alleged
that the substance of the letter constituted false and misleading
advertising in violation of RPC 7.1 (a) (1).
The Advertising Committee initially determined that the
First Amendment protected the Anis' targeted solicitation. Id. at
454, 599 A.2d at 1268. Nevertheless, the Advertising Committee found that the letter represented false and misleading adver-
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tising and, therefore, recommended that both attorneys receive
public reprimands. Id. at 453-54, 599 A.2d at 1268.
Reviewing the suggested discipline, the Disciplinary Review
Board (DRB) determined that the letter reached the Lowensteins
at a time when it remained questionable whether the attorneys
should have known that the family would be incapable of making
a reasoned judgment in securing legal representation. Id. at 455,
599 A.2d at 1268. The DRB nonetheless concluded, without applying First Amendment protection to the letter, that the solicitation did not violate RPC 7.3 (b)(l). The DRB, however,
determined that the letter was substantively unethical and recommended a private reprimand. Id. at 454, 455, 599 A.2d at 1268,
1269. The DRB limited its recommended discipline to Magdy
Anis because Fady Anis did not participate in the mailing. Id. at
454, 599 A.2d at 1268.
Reversing the Advertising Committee, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that Magdy Anis knew or should have
known that the Lowenstein family would be incapable of exercising reasonable judgment in retaining an attorney at the time of
solicitation. Id. at 460, 599 A.2d at 1271. The court further determined that the solicitation was false and misleading. Id. at
461, 599 A.2d at 1271-72.
Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Wilentz began by emphasizing the increased standard of professionalism expected
from attorneys. Id. at 455-56, 599 A.2d at 1269. Examining the
precedential value of United States Supreme Court pronouncements relating to commercial speech, ChiefJustice Wilentz found
that the First Amendment protected such speech as long as the
speech pertained to lawful activities and did not mislead the recipient. Id. at 456, 599 A.2d at 1269. The chief justice noted,
however, that protected speech may be regulated if a substantial
governmental interest was advanced and the regulation was appropriately tailored to that interest. Id. (citing Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm., 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2287 (1990)). Chief Justice
Wilentz distinguished the United States Supreme Court prohibition against banning targeted mail solicitations based on the increased degree of intrusiveness involved in the case at bar. Id.
Subsequently, the court addressed the standard of knowledge set forth in RPC 7.3 (b)(1). Id. at 457, 599 A.2d at 1270.
Rejecting the DRB's application of a subjective standard, the
supreme court utilized an objective standard and noted that such
objectivity alleviates an attorney from the burden of determining
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whether the solicited party was unduly sensitive. Id. at 457-58,
599 A.2d at 1270.
After quickly dismissing the applicability of the overbreadth
doctrine to commercial speech, the majority concluded that solicitation which intruded on the particular vulnerability of grieving
families was beyond common decency and not constitutionally
protected. Id. The court recognized that, despite the potential
public benefits derived from attorney advertising, strict regulation was justified due to attorneys' unique role in society. Id. at
458-59, 599 A.2d at 1270-71.
Thereafter, the court opined that clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that Magdy Anis solicited prospective clients when an ordinarily prudent attorney would have
found the family unable to make a reasonable judgment in retaining an attorney. Id. at 460, 599 A.2d at 1271. Recognizing the
varying degrees of loss and suffering, the court declined to define
a bright-line rule for future application. Id. Instead, the court
referred the issue to the Advertising Committee to determine a
"clearer line of vulnerability." Id. Chief Justice Wilentz additionally decided that, until the court received direction from an
Advertising Committee informational hearing, an attorney may
solicit business without risking potential discipline when more
than two weeks pass after the prospective client's loss became
known. Id. The court specified that this guideline was inapplicable, however, if the attorney had specific evidence that the family
at issue was unable to make a reasonable judgment or if the solicitation was false or misleading. Id.
The court continued its analysis by addressing the truthfulness of the solicitation letter, concluding that the letter constituted misleading advertising. Id. at 461, 599 A.2d at 1271-72.
Initially, the majority determined that Magdy Anis incorrectly
suggested that other attorneys would charge one-third of the client's recovery despite the graduated fee system set forth in New
Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7. Id., 599 A.2d at 1272. The court additionally noted that Magdy Anis inaccurately intimated that he had
experience in aircraft accident litigation. Id. Thereafter, Chief
Justice Wilentz concluded that these violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct required that Magdy Anis be publicly reprimanded. Id.
Justice Handler, in a concurring opinion, declared that the
timing of the solicitation was inappropriate and that the letter
was substantially misleading. Id. at 462, 599 A.2d at 1272 (Han-
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dler, J., concurring). The justice voiced concern, however, that
the majority's opinion may be misconstrued to require indecency
as a necessary element in sanctioning an attorney. Id. The concurringjustice asserted that such solicitation should be forbidden
because it hurt the prospective client and invaded his privacy, not
because it was indecent. Id. at 463-64, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring). Emphasizing that commercial speech may
be limited only when a substantial governmental interest can be
advanced, the justice asserted that New Jersey lacked a substantial interest in regulating attorneys that offended societal mores.
Id. at 464, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
In In re Anis, both the majority and the concurrence impliedly
recognized the tension between an attorney's right to pursue
business and the prospective client's right to privacy. As suggested by the majority and re-emphasized by Justice Handler,
regulation of attorney advertising should focus on the degree of
harm suffered by the potential client. The more serious the loss,
the stronger the privacy interest that person should enjoy.
A sliding scale of time requirements, during which a prospective client is deemed incapable of exercising reasonable
judgment, should be drawn to coincide with the victim's varying
degrees of privacy. Such future regulation would benefit all. Prospective clients would be safe from insensitive solicitation, while
still obtaining the general benefits of advertising. Attorneys
would be permitted to advertise their services in pursuit of future
business while conforming their behavior to comply with welldefined regulations. In addition, the legal profession's reputation would improve from regulation that recognizes victim's privacy. Such regulation would preclude the negative consequences
from what the public perceives as "ambulance chasing."
Jean L. Dusinski
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CRIMINAL

LAW-INDIGENT DEFENDANTS-PUBLIC DEFENDER
ACT REQUIRES THE PUBLIC DEFENDER TO FUND NECESSARY
ANCILLARY SERVICES

FOR AN

INDIGENT DEFENDANT

SENTED BY PRIVATE COUNSEL-In

REPRE-

re Cannady, 126 N.J. 486,

600 A.2d 459 (1991).
After Janice .Cannady was indicted for murdering her live-in
boyfriend, her family retained private defense counsel who determined that Cannady was a victim of Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) at the time of the killing. 126 NJ. at 487, 600 A.2d
at 459. Cannady's family, however, was unable to afford the
$3,000 fee required to retain a BWS expert. Id. at 488, 600 A.2d
at 459.
Subsequently, Cannady moved to compel the Public Defender's Office (PDO) to pay the expert's fee. Id. The trial court
found that the Public Defender Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 158A- 1
to 25 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (Act), required the PDO to pay
such fees for an indigent defendant despite representation by
private counsel. Id., 600 A.2d at 460. The trial court ordered
Cannady to establish her indigence and the necessity of the expert's testimony. Id. At the hearing, the PDO did not dispute the
necessity of the testimony or the reasonableness of the expert's
fee but rather asserted that the cost of ancillary legal services
should be borne by Essex County. Id. The trial court ordered the
PDO to pay the fee. Id.
The appellate division denied the PDO's motion for leave to
appeal. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the motion
and, affirming the trial court, held that the Act required the PDO
to pay for necessary ancillary services for indigent defendants
represented by private counsel. Id.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Garibaldi began the
analysis with an historical overview of the defense of indigent
persons in New Jersey. Id. The justice recounted that, prior to
adoption of the Act, New Jersey had used an assigned counsel
system under which attorneys were alphabetically assigned to indigent defendants in their county. Id. at 489, 600 A.2d at 460
(citing State v. Rush, 46 NJ. 339, 407 n.1, 217 A.2d 441, 445 n.1
(1966)). The court also noted that, except in murder cases, attorneys were not compensated under the assigned counsel system.
Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-1 (West 1985)).
The justice explained that increased caseloads and changes
in criminal law led the New Jersey Supreme Court to rule that
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each county was responsible for the attorney's fees of its indigent
defendants. Id. (citing State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 412, 414-15, 217
A.2d 441, 448, 448-49 (1966)). Justice Garibaldi observed that
the court delayed the operative date of that decision to allow the
legislature to implement a system providing for such defendants,
at which time the legislature enacted the Public Defender Act and
established the PDO. Id. at 489-90, 600 A.2d at 460 (citing State
v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 415, 217 A.2d 441, 449 (1966)).
Examining the Act's legislative history, Justice Garibaldi
stated that the Act's purpose was to implement proposals detailed in the Report of the New Jersey Commission on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime (Commission),
which specially recommended that the costs associated with the
PDO not be partitioned among counties. Id. at 490, 600 A.2d at
460-61 (citing

REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON THE

DEFENSE OF INDIGENT PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME,

L. 1967, ch.

43, § 24). The court observed that the Commission had expressed concern that apportioning the costs of services among
counties would compromise control over the quality, uniformity,
economy and efficiency of services. Id., 600 A.2d at 461 (citing
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON THE DEFENSE OF IN-

L. 1967, ch. 43, § 24).
Considering the Act's language, Justice Garibaldi rejected
the PDO's argument that an indigent defendant must be represented by the PDO to obtain collateral services. Id. at 491-92, 600
A.2d at 461-62. The court interpreted the Act to extend eligibility for PDO services to any indigent unable to pay for ancillary
services, rejecting the notion that one's inability to hire private
counsel is necessary for eligibility. Id. at 492, 600 A.2d at 462.
Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the Act does not require that
an indigent be provided PDO services prior to the provision of
ancillary services by the PDO. Id.
After setting out the statutory framework for its holding, the
court outlined several guidelines for its implementation. Id. Justice Garibaldi asserted that the Act's provision giving the PDO
discretion to decide what services shall be rendered to an indigent defendant, must be construed to give the PDO the same
control over services provided to defendants represented by
outside counsel. Id. at 493, 600 A.2d at 462 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West 1985)). Such control was mandated,
the justice determined, by the PDO's budgetary constraints. Id.
(citing State v. Cantalupo, 187 N.J. Super. 113, 121, 453 A.2d 913,
DIGENT PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME,
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917 (App. Div. 1982)). Justice Garibaldi stated that, similarly, the
PDO must determine what services are necessary and what costs
are justified in the context of a contract between the PDO and a
private attorney. Id.
The court subsequently proposed a procedure to allow the
PDO to retain its authority over such decisions. Id. Initially, the
court proposed that when an indigent represented by private
counsel applied to the PDO for services, the PDO should not
leave the determination of indigence to the court, but should instead play an "integral role" in such a decision. Id. at 494, 600
A.2d at 462. Secondly, Justice Garibaldi asserted that the defendant's application for PDO funds should disclose the terms of
the retainer agreement as well as any pertinent discovery. Id., 600
A.2d at 463. Thejustice speculated that, in some circumstances,
the applicant would also be asked to disclose the defense theory,
statements made by the defendant or potential witnesses and a
proffer of the witnesses' testimony to establish a defense expense
is necessary. Id. (citing State v. Cantalupo, 187 N.J. Super. 113,
120, 453 A.2d 913, 917 (App. Div. 1982)).
Finally, the court suggested that once the application is
properly documented, the PDO should consider whether the service requested: (1) has a reasonable relation to the issues and the
defense, (2) is of real value in relation to the PDO's financial constraints, and (3) is generally available to defendants represented
by the PDO. Id. at 495, 600 A.2d at 463. The court also recommended considering whether counsel could have anticipated the
necessity of these services upon being retained. Id.
Justice Garibaldi then addressed the PDO's concern that allowing a privately represented defendant to receive services from
the PDO contravened the policy of fairness that underlies the
Act. Id. at 495-96, 600 A.2d at 463. The court noted that a defendant relieved of the burden of paying an expert's fee was put
in a better position than defendants represented by the PDO or
non-indigent defendants with limited means. Id. at 496, 600 A.2d
at 463-64. The court concluded, however, that requiring disclosure of private counsel's fee arrangements provided an adequate safeguard against such a defendant receiving an unfair
advantage over persons represented by the PDO. Id., 600 A.2d at
464. Justice Garibaldi reasoned that, if counsel's fees were too
high, the services would be denied and the private attorney
would be forced to reduce his fee to cover the cost of the services. Id.
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As a final procedural matter, the court cautioned that the
reasons for rejecting an applicant's request for funds must be reduced to writing and sent to the defendant. Id. at 497, 600 A.2d
at 464. The court further explained that the decision to grant or
deny an application is subject to review by the assignment judge
or the trial court. Id. The court noted that in the present case the
trial court, rather than the PDO, determined that the expert was
necessary and that her fees were reasonable. Id. at 498, 600 A.2d
at 464-65. Acknowledging that this was not the proper procedure
under the guidelines set forth, the court nonetheless concluded
that the result should stand as the PDO had not argued that the
expert was unnecessary or that her fees were unreasonable. Id.,
600 A.2d at 465.
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly concluded that the
PDO must fund collateral services required by indigent defendants represented by private counsel. The goal of the Public Defender Act is to provide competent legal representation to those
who could not otherwise afford it. This goal is meaningless if the
necessary ancillary services, such as expert testimony, are not
provided. Denying the benefit of these services to indigents not
represented by the PDO would effectively punish a poor defendant for taking financial responsibility for at least a part of her own
legal expenses. Likewise, requiring each county to fund these
services would clearly contravene the goals of the Act.
The court was also correct in acknowledging the potential
for abuse. It is not clear that the disclosure provision will provide an adequate safeguard. It may be that an attorney would
choose to forego an expert's service rather than reduce his fees,
especially when the need for the service was not contemplated at
the time of the retainer agreement. Other attorneys may become
reluctant to even contemplate the use of such services, all at the
peril of indigent defendants. The real issue underlying the Cannady decision, the severe shortage of funds available for public
defense, must still be resolved.
Tracey A. Freile
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NONCAPITAL MURDER OFFENSE MUST BE OFFERED FOR JURY DELIBERATION IN GUILT PHASE OF TRIAL FOR DEATH PENALTY TO
LAW-CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT-DEFENDANT'S

BE IMPOSED-State V. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 601 A.2d 175
(1992).
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on August 26, 1988, defendant
Braynard Purnell, arrived at the home of Marie Simmons to
purchase cocaine. 126 N.J. at 524-25, 601 A.2d at 178. At defendant's request, Simmons met with Lawrence Talley to
purchase cocaine, but the two could not agree on a price. Id. at
525, 601 A.2d at 178. Later, defendant met with Talley and Jeffrey Davis at a neighborhood playground and the three men left
for defendant's house. Davis -departed from the other men
before reaching the house.
Around 9:00 p.m., several members of defendant's family
saw defendant fighting with an unidentified man in the defendant's backyard. These witnesses also saw defendant chase a
couple of men into the woods and, from the woods, heard scuffling and someone shouting, "Don't leave me Jeff' and, "Jeff,
he's trying to kill me." Police arrived and, after speaking briefly
with defendant's daughter, quickly searched the backyard. Id. at
526, 601 A.2d at 178. Soon afterward, Simmons and Davis attempted, without success, to locate Talley. Id., 601 A.2d at 17879. By 10:30 p.m., defendant arrived at Simmons' house and
gave her one and one-half grams of cocaine. Id. at 527, 601 A.2d
at 179. Defendant left her house at one point, but returned with
another one and one-half grams of cocaine and some smaller
bags of the drug. Two days later, Davis and Talley's sister
searched defendant's property and found Talley lying dead in a
hedgerow. Id.at 527-28, 601 A.2d at 179. Talley died from fifteen stab wounds; no drugs or money were found on his body. Id.
at 528, 601 A.2d at 179.
Defendant was arrested and, subsequently, made conflicting
statements to police and the Camden County grand jury about
seeing Talley and being in a fight on the night of the murder. Id.
at 528-29, 601 A.2d at 179-80. Defendant denied fighting with
Talley or having any involvement in Talley's killing. Id. at 524,
529, 601 A.2d at 177, 180. At trial, although defendant was not
indicted for robbery, the state offered evidence that, on the evening of the murder, defendant possessed cocaine in the same
type of packaging used by Talley. Id. at 524, 601 A.2d at 177.
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The jury convicted defendant of knowing and/or purposeful
murder, among other charges. Id. at 529, 601 A.2d at 180. The
prosecution asserted two aggravating factors in the sentencing
phase: that defendant was convicted of a previous murder and
that the murder was committed during a robbery. Id. Defendant
was sentenced to death and, thereafter, appealed to the supreme
court as of right under NewJersey Court Rule 2:2-1(a). Id. at 530,
601 A.2d at 180.
The central issue addressed by the court was whether
a jury
may render a death sentence on the basis that a murder occurred
during a felony, without being allowed to consider a non-capital
felony murder verdict in the guilt phase of a capital trial. Id. at
523, 601 A.2d at 177. The court held that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to have a non-capital form of murder offered
for jury deliberation in a capital trial's guilt phase where existing
proofs supply rational support for a jury verdict on that alternative offense. Id. at 532, 601 A.2d at 181-82 (citing State v. Coyle,
119 N.J. 194, 574 A.2d 951 (1990)).
Writing for the court, Justice O'Hern first observed that felony murder is not death-eligible under New Jersey's capital sentencing scheme. Id. at 530, 601 A.2d at 181. The justice
reiterated that all types of homicide, whether alternative or
lesser-included offenses, should be presented to the jury if rationally sustained by the evidence. Id. Justice O'Hern noted that
felony murder is technically not a lesser-included offense of murder, but maintained that it should be charged to a jury, subject to
fair notice requirements and a reasonable, factual foundation. Id.
at 531, 601 A.2d at 181 (citing State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 265,
590 A.2d 1107 (1991) (Stein, J., concurring)). The court further
asserted that all possible offenses that may reasonably be drawn
from the facts must be charged to the jury. Id. (quoting State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 271 n.62, 524 A.2d 188 (1987)). Justice
O'Hern stressed that the judicial duty to insure impartial jury deliberations based exclusively on the evidence and in accordance
with proper and sufficient instructions compose the core of a fair
criminal trial. Id. (citing State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 398 A.2d 861
(1979)).
Justice O'Hern emphasized that a New Jersey capital defendant must have a knowing or purposeful intent to cause death to
receive the death penalty for murder. Id. at 532, 601 A.2d at 181
(citing State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988)). The
justice opined that the state, by designating robbery as an aggra-
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vating component, affirmed that proofs existed from which the
jury could rationally find defendant guilty of the death-ineligible,
felony murder option. Id., 601 A.2d at 182. According to Justice
O'Hern, a trial court cannot constitutionally withhold a lesserincluded alternate murder charge where it would arguably affect
deliberation of the death sentence. Id. The justice acknowledged
that in jurisdictions where intentional murder and felony murder
are both death-eligible, there is no need to submit a separate felony murder verdict to the jury in a trial's guilt phase because the
aggravating factor would merely serve as a sentencing guide. Id.
at 533, 601 A.2d at 182 (citation omitted). Further, the court
noted that there is no requirement for every aggravating factor
that makes murder death-eligible to be part of an indictment or
verdict. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(West 1987)). Justice O'Hern concluded, however, that when the separate offense
within the aggravating factor is a form of non-capital murder, a
defendant has a constitutional right to have the alternative offered in guilt-phasejury deliberation. Id. at 534, 601 A.2d at 182.
Thus, because defendant was deprived of the right to have all
possible offenses reasonably found in the evidence offered for
jury deliberation, the court vacated the death sentence but affirmed the murder conviction and other counts and remanded
the matter to the trial court. Id. at 534, 547, 601 A.2d at 182, 189.
The court went on to address remaining issues rendered
moot by its decision. Id. at 534-47, 601 A.2d 182-88. Most importantly, Justice O'Hern considered whether the failure to
charge felony murder formed grounds for the murder conviction's reversal. Id. at 542, 601 A.2d at 186. The majority found
that because it had vacated the death sentence, the defendant did
not suffer from prejudice even though he was convicted of knowing or purposeful murder rather than felony murder. Id. at 543,
601 A.2d at 187. Justice O'Hern added, however, that the murder conviction would necessarily be vacated and retried if the
state later sought a death sentence. Id.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Handler
argued that, by relying on robbery and felony murder as grounds
for the death sentence, but withholding the deliberation of defendant's guilt for those crimes from the jury, the capital prosecution was fundamentally flawed and, therefore, defendant's
murder conviction warranted reversal. Id. at 547, 549, 601 A.2d
at 189, 190 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The justice posited that this procedure was unfair to the
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defendant because the separate processes of assessing guilt and
punishment required qualitatively distinct types of jury deliberation. Id. at 550-51, 601 A.2d at 191 (Handler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Justice Handler stressed that, in capital sentencing, a jury
must reconsider all evidence anew and may not simply adopt its
antecedent determination of guilt for one offense when deciding
whether defendant committed a felony offered as an aggravating
factor. Id. at 554, 601 A.2d at 192 (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). According to Justice Handler, a procedure that permits a jury in a single decisional process to determine both a defendant's criminal guilt and whether that
culpability should be punished by death, like the one found in
New Jersey's capital murder statute, is unconstitutional. Id. at
552, 601 A.2d at 191 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, Justice Handler asserted that the
court's decision was unfair to the defendant because, while noncapital murder and felony murder sentences are identical, a
lesser stigma attaches to the latter. Id. at 557, 601 A.2d at 194
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Purnelldecision appropriately engenders judicial realism
and efficiency. The failure to properly charge the jury did not
bring about an unjust result, although the defendant was, in effect, sentenced for a crime that he was not found guilty of committing. The defendant escaped a death sentence because of the
prosecution's misjudgment, not because he was innocent. In its
guilt phase deliberations, the jury apparently found the defendant guilty of knowing and/or purposeful murder without relying
on robbery evidence. The court's opinion appears to have remedied the problem of guilt determination in the sentencing phase.
The decision will certainly curtail similar charging errors in the
future and, thereby, serve to promote defendants' fair trial rights
and the public interest in having all criminal offenses considered.
Brett M. Reina
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INSURANCE LAW-NEW JERSEY INSURANCE FRAUD ACT-TRIAL
JUDGE HAS DISCRETION

UNDER INSURANCE

FRAUD ACT TO

SEPARATELY PENALIZE EACH INDIVIDUAL MATERIAL STATEMENT
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF A CLAIM IF PENALTY Is

REMEDIAL

IN NATURE-Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 599 A.2d 1256
(1992).
On June 10, 1988, the defendant, Robert Maglaki, pleaded
guilty to the criminal charge of third degree attempted theft by
deception and the trial court sentenced him to probation, community service and a fine. 126 N.J. at 433, 599 A.2d at 1257-58.
Maglaki filed a false insurance claim with Prudential Insurance
Company (Prudential) to collect $300,000 in life insurance proceeds from two policies taken out on his wife, Antonieta. The
defendant offered six fraudulent documents as evidence that his
wife died in a Philippines automobile accident on June 18, 1986.
Three of the documents purported to be official documents of
the Philippines. Antonieta Maglaki was, however, still alive. Id.,
599 A.2d at 1258.
Subsequent to Maglaki's sentencing, the Commissioner of
Insurance (Commissioner) filed a civil suit against the defendant
under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (Act). Id. (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)). The Act authorized the Commissioner to seek civil penalties from any individual who submitted a materially false statement to prove a
fraudulent insurance claim. Id. at 432, 599 A.2d at 1257 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)). The Act
also provided the trial courts with the discretion to impose penalties up to $5,000 for the first offense, $10,000 for the second violation and $15,000 for each subsequent infraction. Id. at 434, 599
A.2d at 1258 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-5 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991)). The Commissioner's complaint contained six
counts, alleging separate violations for each falsified document
tendered by Maglaki. Id. at 433-34, 599 A.2d at 1258.
Although it granted the Commissioner's summary judgment
motion regarding liability, the trial court determined that the legislature did not intend the Act to penalize each individual statement offered in support of a false claim. Id. at 434, 599 A.2d at
1258. The trial court thus refused to impose six separate $5,000
penalties and held instead that Maglaki's actions constituted a
single violation. Id. The trial court set the penalty at $2,500. Id.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed
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the trial court's decision and the New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification. Id. (citation omitted). Reversing the lower
courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the submission
of six falsified documents could constitute six separate offenses
under the Act and that the imposition of remedial civil penalties
did not contravene state and federal double jeopardy protections. Id. at 432, 434, 599 A.2d at 1257, 1258.
Writing for the majority, Justice Garibaldi first addressed the
penalty's scope in light of the plain language and purpose of the
statute itself. Id. at 334-40, 599 A.2d at 1258-61. The court determined that the statute's wording unambiguously set forth the
legislature's intent to penalize any fraudulent statement that supported a false insurance claim. Id. at 435, 599 A.2d at 1259. Justice Garibaldi noted that the statute used the word "statement,"
rather than "claim," to define a violation of the Act. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the statute penalized the submission of
"any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy." Id. (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-4 (West
1988 & Supp. 1991)(emphasis added)). The majority also submitted that the legislature would have drafted the statutory language differently if it had intended to penalize entire claims
rather than individual statements. Id. Because the legislature's
wording is considered dispositive, id. (citing Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555, 258 A.2d 6 (1969)), the court held
that a false claimant violated the Act every time the claimant
presented a false statement to an insurance company as proof of
a fraudulent claim. Id. at 432, 599 A.2d at 1257. Therefore, the
court concluded that Maglaki committed six separate offenses. Id.
at 440, 599 A.2d at 1261.
After analyzing the statute's plain language, Justice Garibaldi
next considered the Act's legislative purpose. Id. at 436-40, 599
A.2d at 1259-61. In so doing, the justice posited that imposing
penalties according to the number of false statements effectively
achieved the legislative purpose of uncovering and eradicating
insurance fraud. Id. at 436, 599 A.2d at 1259. The court posited
that imposing penalties based on the number of false claims,
rather than statements, undercut the statute's deterrent effect. Id.
at 338-39, 599 A.2d at 1260.
The court then analogized the case at bar to a prior New
Jersey Supreme Court decision that upheld the assessment of
multiple penalties against a doctor who infected ninety-two pa-
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tients with hepatitis by using improperly sterilized syringes. Id.
(citing In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 414 A.2d 1339
(1980)). In DeMarco, Justice Garibaldi noted, the trial court fined
the doctor the statutory maximum for each of the ninety-two persons he infected even though this was the first time such charges
were brought against him. Id. The majority recognized the
DeMarco Court's reasoning that a contrary holding would undermine the statute's intended purpose of discouraging physicians
from carelessly endangering patient's lives. Id. (citation omitted).
The court further noted that it was inherently unfair to
equally penalize the claimant who submitted a single false statement (single claimant) and the claimant who submitted several
(multi-claimant). Id. at 337, 599 A.2d at 1260. The court reasoned that the single claimant may have fallen victim to a momentary lapse of conscience, while the multi-claimant may have
organized a premeditated plot to defraud the insurance company. Id. The majority maintained that there is a greater chance
that the multi-claimant will successfully defraud the insurance
company because additional "evidence" increases the likelihood
of payment. Id.
The court then expressed that it accords considerable deference to a reasonable statutory reading by the governmental
agency or officer in charge of administering a statute. Id. at 337,
599 A.2d at 1259 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327, 478 A.2d 742 (1984)). Because the Commissioner has a substantial interest in deterring insurance fraud,
the court posited that the Commissioner justifiably interpreted
the statute to penalize each individual statement. Id. at 336, 599
A.2d at 1259. The court also recognized that the Commissioner's position was the most effective means of preventing insurance fraud. Id. Thus, Justice Garibaldi concluded that
Maglaki could be penalized for six separate violations of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act. Id. at 440, 599 A.2d at 1261.
Upon completion of her statutory analysis, Justice Garibaldi
next examined whether the penalty violated the double jeopardy
protection's of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 440-46,
599 A.2d at 1261-64. Justice Garibaldi first noted that double
jeopardy protections usually do not attach in civil actions. Id. (citing In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 111, 444 A.2d 1107 (1982)). The
majority quickly pointed out that the legislature's mere labelling
of a statute as "civil," however, does not avoid a judicial double
jeopardy review. Id. at 440-41, 599 A.2d at 1261. The majority
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stressed that the court must scrutinize a civil penalty to determine whether it acts as a deterrent or serves to compensate the
state for its losses. Id. at 442, 599 A.2d at 1262 (quoting United
States v. Halper,490 U.S. 435, 441-42, 448-49 (1989)). According
to the court, civil statutes that serve as deterrents are subject to
double jeopardy challenges. Id. The court held that the penalty
imposed on Maglaki, however, was remedial in nature and thus
did not contravene double jeopardy protections. Id. at 432-33,
599 A.2d at 1257.
The majority cited two cases as precedent for this holding.
Id. at 440-44; 599 A.2d at 1261-63 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. 435;
In re Garay, 89 N.J. 104, 444 A.2d 1107). Justice Garibaldi recognized that the standard articulated in these two cases is highly
fact sensitive. Id. For example, the majority noted that the Halper
Court concluded that "a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may
not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution." Id. at 442, 599 A.2d at 1262 (quoting United States v.
Halper,490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)). Justice Garibaldi also cautioned that a penalty greatly disproportionate to an amalgam of
the actual loss and the costs incurred would not be acceptable
under the Halper standard. Id. at 443, 599 A.2d at 1262-63 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)).
Using these standards as her guide, Justice Garibaldi held
that the $30,000 sought by the Commissioner in the instant case
reasonably reflected the state's costs in having to investigate and
bring Maglaki to trial. Id. at 444, 599 A.2d at 1263. The justice
noted that the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act created the Division of Insurance Fraud Prevention to aid the discovery and
prosecution of insurance fraud. Id. at 445, 599 A.2d at 1263-64.
Justice Garibaldi further explained that this branch of the Department of Insurance employs an office staff and investigators. Id.
The justice recognized that the task of detecting insurance fraud
in New Jersey involves expenses that include the costs associated
with verification of legitimate claims, inquiry into false claims and
litigation. Id., 599 A.2d at 1264. Therefore, the court found the
claimant's success in securing the undue insurance benefits is irrelevant. Id. These factors indicated to Justice Garibaldi that the
Commissioner had a compelling interest in asking for the maximum penalty allowed under the statute. Id. at 444, 599 A.2d at
1263. While acknowledging that the final assessment of damages
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ultimately rested with the trial judge, id. at 446, 599 A.2d at 1264,
the court held that the $30,000 sought by the Commissioner was
remedial in nature and not disproportionate to governmental expenses. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clifford voiced no disagreement with the majority's holding regarding the inapplicability of
the double jeopardy protection to the civil penalty. Id. at 446- 47,
599 A.2d at 1264 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford was
not, however, convinced that the language of the Insurance
Fraud Protection Act clearly authorized the sanction of materially
false statements as opposed to false claims. Id. at 446, 599 A.2d
at 1264 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford asserted that the
statute's plain language did not unequivocally express an intention to penalize each -statement submitted in support of a false
claim. Id. Justice Clifford further posited that the legislature
would have composed language illustrative of an intention to penalize each individual statement if that was its intention. Id. at
446-47, 599 A.2d at 1264 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford noted that the legislature had previously established multiple penalties for single offenses through express. statutory
language. Id. (citation omitted). Absent such unambiguous language, Justice Clifford averred that a separate penalty should
only be applied when a separate injury has occurred. Id. at 447,
599 A.2d at 1265 (Clifford, J., dissenting). In the instant case,
the dissent determined that the injury did not meet that standard. Id.
Justice Clifford also recognized that the statute granted trial
courts significant discretion to set the amount of the penalty
based on the severity of the deception. Id. Justice Clifford suggested that when the level of deceit and premeditation rose to
the point where numerous fraudulent statements were submitted, the court could impose a fine closer to the statutory maximum. Id.
There seem to be two significant problems with the majority's reasoning in Merin v. Maglaki. The first involves its statutory
interpretation. The case that the majority cites to support its
holding supports Justice Clifford's position that separate penalties should be imposed for each separate injury. In re Suspension of
DeMarco saw ninety-two distinct penalties imposed on a doctor
who infected ninety-two individual patients with hepatitis. The
majority used this case to bolster its argument that the statute's
strength and purpose would be undermined if only one penalty
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was imposed. Each of DeMarco's ninety-two patients suffered a
separate injury, which makes it easier to justify imposing separate
penalties on the doctor. It certainly would have defeated the legislative purpose and the effectiveness of the statute if the doctor
had been penalized only once for causing ninety-two injuries. In
the instant case, the six separate violations-the six falsified documents-resulted in only one injury. DeMarco is an example of
ninety-two causes and ninety-two effects; Maglaki is an example
of six causes and one effect.
The second significant problem results from an apparent
contradiction between the majority's statutory interpretation and
its double jeopardy holding. The majority stated that part of the
reason for penalizing the submission of each false statement was
to increase the statute's effectiveness as a deterrent. In examining whether the civil penalty violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause, however, the majority quoted from United States v. Halper:
"A defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 442, 599
A.2d at 1262 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 44849 (1989)). According to this quote, if the reason for imposing
the civil sanction is to deter insurance fraud, the penalty is not
remedial in nature and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. In
holding that the civil penalty should be assessed based on the
submission of false statements, rather than false claims, the majority considered the deterrent effect of penalizing false statements greater than the deterrent effect of penalizing false claims.
Deterrence, however, should not have been the motivating factor
for the decision. A civil penalty is a permissible means for the
state to recover damages. The majority never addressed whether
a penalty imposed for the submission of false statements is necessary as a more effective means of reimbursing the government
for any resultant losses which occur. Because of these two
problems, Merin v. Maglaki is, unfortunately, poor precedent.
Christine M. Gurry

